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COMPULSORY JOINDER OF PARTIES
IN TEXAS
William V. Dorsaneo III*
"What's a necessary party?"
The White Knight rolled his eyes. "A necessary party," he intoned,
"is a party that is necessary."
Alice thought for a moment. "Then both of us can be sued in El Paso
if they can't sue one of us without suing the other?"
"Not that necessary. A necessary party need not be indispensable."
"Then how necessary is necessary?" Alice persisted.
"A necessary party is one without whom complete relief can't be
granted. That's simple enough!" said the White Knight, severely.
Guittard, Alice in Venue Landt
I. INTRODUCnON
Few procedural subjects have proved knottier than compulsory joinder
of parties in civil litigation. The purpose of this article is to review the
principles of compulsory joinder in Texas in an effort to demonstrate how
they developed and how they have been modified. This development may
be conveniently, although somewhat arbitrarily, divided into four parts:
(1) the influence of the common law and the principles of equity juris-
prudence upon principles of compulsory joinder of parties in Texas; (2)
the effect of Texas case law prior to the promulgation of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1941; (3) the interpretation of Rule 39 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure as it was initially promulgated in 1941; and
(4) the impact of the 1971 amendment to Rule 39 as interpreted by cur-
rent Texas case law.
H. THa INFLUEICE OF COzMMON LAw PMNcInLEs AND
EQUITY JUIUSPnUDENCE
Section 13 of the judiciary article (art IV) of the Constitution of 1836
directed the Congress of the Republic of Texas to introduce the common
law of England "with such modifications as our circumstances, in their
judgment, may require," in the Republic of Texas.' Thereafter the First
Congress of the Republic enacted the following law at its first session:
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The common law of England, as now practiced and understood,
shall, in its application to juries and to evidence, be followed and
practiced by the courts of this republic, so far as the same may
not be inconsistent with this act, or any other law passed by this
congress.2
Similarly, on January 20, 1840, the Fourth Congress of the Republic
passed "An Act to Adopt the Common Law of England, to Repeal Certain
Mexican Laws, and to Regulate Marital Bights of Parties."3 This act
repealed all laws enacted prior to the adoption of the constitution of the
Republic; the common law of England, the Texas constitution, and the
statutes passed by the Congress of the Republic were then substituted for
prior law. The passage of "An Act To Regulate Proceedings in Civil Suits"
on February 5, 1840, made it clear, however, that the adoption of the
common law in Texas did not include the adoption of the common law
system of pleadings.4 Moreover, section 12 of the Civil Practice Act specified
that both law and equity were to be administered by the same court in
the same cause and that Texas would have a combined system of law and
equity as well as a simplified system of pleading.' Texas appears to have
been one of the first jurisdictions to abolish law and equity as separate
judicial systems.6 The decision to blend the systems of law and equity
undoubtedly left many questions unanswered. As the following paragraphs
will indicate, the law courts viewed the subject of compulsory joinder of
parties differently than the courts in equity and, to the extent that the two
views were inconsistent, the inconsistencies were not resolved by the simple
expedient of combining proceedings in one tribunal. One of the principal
theses of this article is that a failure to reconcile disparate ideas on com-
pulsory joinder, either at the time the two systems were combined or any
time thereafter, has caused much of the difficulty which has confronted
2. Tex. Laws 1836, An Act Organizing the Inferior Courts, and Defining the
Powers and Jurisdiction of the Same § 41, at 156-57, reprinted in 1 H. GAMmL, LAWS
OF TEXAs 1216-17 (1898).
3. J. TowNEs, PLEADI G IN TnE DiSTrCT Am COUNTY CounTs OF TExAs 85(2d ed. 1913).
4. Tex. Laws 1840, An Act To Regulate Proceedings in Civil Suits 88-93, reprinted
in 2 H. CAMMEL, LAws or TExAs 262-67 (1898).
5. Although the exact nature of this system of pleading is beyond the scope of
this article, its object was to simplify as much as possible
that branch of the proceedings in courts, which by the ingenuity and learning
of both common and civil law lawyers and judges, has become so refined in
its subtleties as to substitute in many instances the shadow for the substance.
Our statute requires, at the hands of the petitioner to a court of justice only
a statement of the names of the parties plaintiff and defendant, a full and
fair exposition of his cause of action, and finally the relief which he asks.
Hamilton v. Black, Dallam 586, 587 (Tex. 1844). See McKnight, The Spanish Influence
on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure, 38 TExAs L. REv. 24 (1959).




the bench and bar in the context of compulsory joinder in Te.xs and else-
where.
In the 1847 case of Coles v. Kelsey,7 the supreme court noticed a
most striking similarity in our forms to the English bill and
answer in chancery, so much so as to leave no doubt of their
kindred origin. They are both derived from the Roman law, out
of which grew up the civil law, which now prevails all over con-
tinental Europe with various modifications; ours came to us through
the laws of Spain. Judge Story says that equity pleadings were
borrowed from the civil law, or from this canon law, which is a
derivative from the civil law, or from both. Hence at almost every
step, we may now trace coincidences in the pleadings and practice
in a Roman suit 8
This remarkable quotation indicates the use of Justice Story's popular
works on equity pleadings in Texas. His analysis has been severely criticized
as lacking in depth and comprehension and as perpetuating erroneous
concepts of compulsory joinder premised upon the view that principles
of compulsory joinder constitute a branch of the law of subject matter
jurisdiction.9 However, an examination of his Commentaries on Equity
Pleadings reveals that the following concepts governed the subject of com-
pulsory joinder of parties in courts of equity.
The rights of no man shall be finally decided in a court ofjustice, unless he himself is present, or at least unless he has had a
full opportunity to appear and vindicate his rights....
All persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially,
in the subject matter of a suit, are to be made parties to it, either
as plaintiffs, or as defendants, however numerous they may be, so
that there may be a complete decree which shall bind them all...
Only persons who have an interest in the object of the suit as
opposed to the subject matter of the suit are ordinarily required to
be made parties....
If a Court of Equity can dispose of the merits of a case before
it without prejudice to the rights or interests of other persons,
who are not parties, or if the circumstances of the case render
the application of the [general] rule wholly impracticable, [e.g.,
when one absent person cannot be reached by process], the gen-
eral rule will not be applied to defeat the very purposes of
justice because the rule is one of convenience and policy. But, "if
complete justice between the parties before the Court cannot be
done without other parties being made, whose rights or interests
will be prejudiced by the decree, then the Court will altogether
stay its proceedings, even though those other parties cannot be
brought before the Court; for in such cases the Court will not, by
its endeavors to do justice between the parties before it, risk the
a
7. 2Ter 542 (1847).
8. Id. at 552-53.
9. Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom,
61 CoLti. L. REV. 1254, 1287 (1961). Refer to notes 84 & 86 infra.
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doing of positive injustice to other parties, not before it, whose
claims are or may be equally meritorious."
If the proper parties are not made, the defendant may demur
to the bill; or take the objection by way of plea or answer; or...,
when the cause comes on for hearing, he may object, that the
proper parties are wanting; or the court itself may state the objec-
tion, and refuse to proceed to make a decree; or, if the decree is
made, it may, for this very defect, be reversed on a rehearing, or
on an appeal; or if it not be reversed, yet it will bind none but
the parties to the suit, and those claiming under him.10
In substance, the general equity rule was that all persons interested
in the object of a suit should be joined as parties. If they refuse to join
voluntarily, they should be served with process and made defendants.
Joinder of all persons interested in the outcome of the litigation will permit
a court to completely resolve the conflict and, consequently, avoid a multi-
plicity of suits. Similarly, all persons who may be affected by the litigation
should be joined unless they are beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
because the court will insist upon doing complete justice between the
parties over whom it has jurisdiction. However, since a nonparty will not
be bound by any decree entered, the court will proceed only if the rights
of the nonparty will not be prejudiced by the judgment. Therefore, the
question is whether the court can enter a decree in the absence of the
nonparty which will be effective to resolve the controversy with respect to
the parties before it.
In conventional terms all persons interested in the subject of the action
are proper parties who should be joined so that a multiplicity of suits may
be avoided. All persons who claim an interest in the object of the suit are
parties without whom the court will not proceed unless it is impracticable
to join them because they are outside of the court's jurisdiction or are too
numerous for joinder. If they cannot practicably be joined, the court should
review the object of the suit to see whether a decree can be rendered
which will be effectual between the parties before the court. If so, the court
should proceed. If any decree entered could be undone in a subsequent
action instituted by a nonparty, the court should not proceed.
Criticism of Justice Story is based upon the view that since a decree
has no res judicata effect upon a nonparty, there is no risk to the nonparty
if the court proceeds to adjudicate the dispute in his absence. Professor
Hazard's influential article rejects the argument that a decree which
is not binding in the sense of res judicata may have an effect upon the
10. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrTY PL.EADINcs 87-88 (5th ed.01852). See
also F. CALlvaRT, A TR-ATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTI S TO SUrts IN EQUrrY
1-18 (1st ed. 1837).
11. Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom,
61 COLum. L. REv. 1254, 1287 (1961). Refer to notes 84 & 86 infra.
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interests of a nonjoined person.' 2 Assuming, however, that Justice Story's
principles are somewhat contradictory in this regard, it must be noted
that he was aware that proceeding in the absence of an interested person
might be a meaningless adventure because of the inability to bind the
nonjoined person. If no decree could be rendered except one which neces-
sarily "affected" the interest of the nonjoined person when the object of
the suit is considered, and if the decree could not preclude him from
instituting a subsequent action that would undo all that was accomplished
in the suit to which he was not a party, what is the sense of proceeding
in his absence in the first place? In short, the second linchpin of Justice
Story's conceptual framework is much harder to criticize. It is not con-
tradictory and, as will be seen in the context of modem Texas cases, the
only answer to it is that a court does not know whether the absent person's
interest will be affected at all until the suit has proceeded in his absence.
Therefore, we do not know whether the absent person will be interested
in undoing the litigation result in the first case until it is concluded.
Justice Story also noted a significant distinction between proceedings
in the courts of law and courts of equity. "In general, courts of la~v require
no more than that all persons directly and immediately interested in the
subject matter of the suit and whose interests are of a strictly legal nature
should be parties to it."'3 This distinction between law and equity must
be kept in mind because the joinder principles enunciated by Justice Story
did not apply in the law courts, where the matter was thought of in an
entirely different way.
It may confidently be stated that the law courts based their principles
of compulsory joinder upon a determination of the nature of the substantive
legal interest'4 At law, once the legal interest was identified, the question
of joinder of parties was resolved. The difference between joint, joint and
several, and several rights was rigidly insisted upon.' 5
Joint contracts are those in which the parties are jointly and
collectively bound to perform the duties or are entitled collectively
to enjoy the rights resulting from the contract The extent of the
liability of each joint obligor is as great as if he alone were bound
for its performance, but his contract does, not bind him to perform
12. Although Professor Hazard recognizes that an absent person may be factually
prejudiced by actions of the parties in accordance with a judgment which cannot be
res judicata as to the nonjoined person, he contends that practical impairment is not
a sufficient reason for a court to fail to proceed. Id. at 1288 n.183.
13. J. STORY, COm rENTAIIuES ON EQurr Pr.4nwcs 92 (5th ed. 1852).
14. See J. CmTrY, A TRETISE ON THE PArens To Acrioss -D oN PLEADiNGs
2 (9th Am. ed. 1844).




his undertaking singly, but only in connection with all his co-
obligors. 6
The preoccupation with the exact nature of the legal interest in the
law courts is philosophically distinct from the principles enunciated by
Justice Story. As will be seen, however, both played a role in the develop-
ment of the law of compulsory joinder of parties in Texas, and both are
with us today even if we sometimes fail to recognize them.
III. EALux TExAs AuTiomTry
Early Texas cases reflect the influence of common law principles of
compulsory joinder as well as equitable concepts of joinder derived from
the works of Justice Story. The following paragraphs discuss the impact of
common law and equity principles and the development of the concept
of fundamental error.
Holliman v. Rogers17 contains a heavy dose of common law reasoning
while at the same time giving consideration to when the absence of an
interested person should be raised. The action was instituted to collect
two promissory notes executed by Holliman, O'Neil, and Grace in favor
of one Frank or bearer. Rogers instituted the action against the defendant
Holiman and did not name either O'Neil or Grace as parties defendant.
The defendant pleaded that the real interest in the notes sued upon was in
Grace, his coworker, who, according to the defendant's allegations and
evidence, had paid the notes and against whom the defendant claimed a
setoff. The defendant did not, however, file a plea in abatement. The
question thus raised was whether the defendant's evidence that Grace
was the real party in interest should have been admitted in the absence
of a plea in abatement. The court states the following general rules:
Should it be said that a defect of parties can only be taken
advantage of by plea in abatement, the answer is that the general
rule that exceptions to parties should be taken advantage of by a
plea in abatement, giving to the party a better writ, is subject to
exceptions; and one of these exceptions is that a defendant may
take advantage of such defect in a party plaintiff on the trial, ff
it should appear from the evidence although not pleaded. Not so,
however, as to want of proper parties defendant. This the defen-
dant must show by his plea and give the names of the parties
that should have been joined with him. If, however, the evidence
16. Id. Townes gives this example:
That is-if A, B and C are joint obligees in an undertaking, and this is not
performed, A can not sue on it, nor can A and B, but A, B and C must sue
3ointly, because performance is not due to A, nor to A and B but to A, B,
and C; and no number less than all can enforce the undertaking. The same
rule applies at common law to the obligors.
17. 6Tex. 91 (1851).
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went to show that the plaintiff in the suit had not merely pre-
sented his right defectively, but that he had no right at all, in
any form of presentation, it would seem that it [evidence that the
right belonged solely to another] was admissible under the plea
in bar.18
The court held that since the excluded testimony demonstrated that
Grace paid the notes as the security of the defendant Holliman, Grace
and not Rogers was the proper party plaintiff. If Grace had paid off the
notes they were extinguished by the payment, and "[t]he right of action
would have been founded upon an implied assumpsit... [which was not]
assignable."' 9 Thus if Holliman could prove that Grace had paid the notes,
he would show that Rogers had no right at all in any form of presentation
and, therefore, no plea in abatement would be necessary. If, however, the
defect in parties consisted of a want of proper parties defendant, the court
stated that a plea in abatement is necessary.
The next case of importance is Anderson v. Chandler.0 Chief Justice
Hemphill there concluded that a coobligor on an obligation could not take
advantage of the omission by the plaintiff of his coobligor except by plea
in abatement unless it should appear from the face of the petition that the
coobligor was living (an unlikely allegation). The reasoning of the chief
justice is especially noteworthy: "[D]efendants ought not to be permitted
to lie by and put plaintiffs to the delay and expense of a trial, and then
[after losing] set up a plea not founded upon the merits of the case, but
upon the form of the proceeding." 2
Therefore, the absence of a coobligor could not be raised for the first
time on appeal unless the plaintiff himself raised the coobligor's absence
by affirmative allegation. Since the plaintiff could readily avoid the allega-
tion that the coobligor was living, the defendant had to raise the matter
prior to appeal as a practical matter. Both Holliman and Anderson focus
upon the nature of the legal interest in formulating principles of joinder.
Somewhat later, the influence of Justice Story's popular works on
equity pleading are manifested in Buffalo Bayou Ship Channel Co. V.
Bruly.2 This was a partition suit in which the court held that no final and
binding decree of partition can be made, even as between the parties
before the court, unless all persons claiming an interest in the property
to be partitioned are joined, "for at any time the owner of the other interest
may sue for partition2 Bruly was followed in De La Vcga v. League,5
which stated the equitable principle that a court "will not make a decree
18. Id. at 97-98 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 97.
20. 18Tex. 436 (1857).
21. Id. at 440, citing Rice v. Shute, 98 Eng. Rep. 374, 375 (K.B. 1770).
22. ]. STORY, COzMENTAREES ON EQurrnY PLx-A nzcs § 72 (8th ed. 1870).
23. 45Tex. 6 (1876).
24. Id. at 8.
25. 64Tex. 205 (1885).
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when it is apparent that it cannot definitely settle the rights of the parties
or make a final disposition of the subject of litigation."2
Both Bruly and De La Vega suggest, however, that the principle was
thought of in practical terms. Courts will not enter decrees which are inef-
fectual or inadequate under their reasoning. Since one who is not a party
could not be bound by the decree, it is impractical to enter a decree which
he may subsequently attack. The point made is vintage Story in that courts
should not waste their time and not that they lacked jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate disputes between the parties before them. However, in Ebell v. Bur-
singer2 7 suit was brought to cancel a deed, procured by threats and intimi-
dation, conveying certain land in trust for the benefit of a third person who
was not named as a party defendant. Judgment was entered by default.
The defendant trustee moved for a nei trial on the ground that the bone-
ficiary had not been joined. The court held that the cestui que trust was a
necessary party and that the trustee could object to the nonjoinder of the
beneficiary after default.2 The case can be analyzed by noting that the
law of trusts which developed in the courts of equity recognized the interest
of a beneficiary and required that all actions brought against the trustee
by the settlor to recover trust property necessitate the joinder of all benefi-
ciaries unless they are too numerous for joinder. Although the interest was
not a joint one in the sense that the law courts considered joint obligees
on a contract to enforce rights together "joint," the principle is roughly
equivalent. The rule may be properly considered a reaction to the law
court's refusal to recognize beneficial interests altogether. Similarly, the
equitable interest of the beneficiary would not be foreclosed by the judg-
ment against the trustee.29 Therefore, a successful attack upon the judgment
awarding recovery of the trust property to the settlor or grantor would
render the judgment nugatory.
Hanner v. Summerhill" is the most significant compulsory joinder case
to be decided before the promulgation of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1941, and its importance requires detailed consideration. The litigation
arose out of a sale of land by James Park to Horace Summerhill for a sum
of $10,000 to be paid in three installments. Park reserved a vendor's lien
upon the land sold as security for the payment of the purchase price. When
Summerhill failed to make the third payment, Park instituted an action
to recover the installment and obtained a judgment. Summerhill obtained
an injunction to enjoin execution of the judgment. Park died and his suit
was renewed in the name of his personal representatives, resulting in the
26. Id. at 212.
27. 70 Tex. 120 (1888).
28. Id. at 123.
29. But see Mason v. Mason, 366 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. 1963) (doctrine of
virtual representation applied in absence of conflict between the cestuis quo trust
and the trustee).
30. 26 S.W. 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ refd).
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injunction being dissolved. Under Park's will, J.P. Harmer was named execu-
tor. Park willed all his money "or money arising to me" to his wife, Mrs.
Park, and J.P. Hanner's wife, and all lands to J.P. Harmer.
Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Harmer sued for recovery of the land or the
purchase price in the alternative. At trial, the claim for the purchase money
was abandoned and J.P. Hanner's claim to the land was the basis of a
judgment against the defendants. When this judgment was appealed,al
the supreme court held that the right to rescind the sale had been waived
by the suit for the purchase money; that J.P. Harmer had no right to recover
the purchase money; that the claim for the purchase money belonged to
Mrs. Hanner and Mrs. Park and, that "[b]y making Mrs. Park a party
plaintiff . . . the appellees may proceed to enforce their claim for the
purchase money."32
When the case was remanded, Mrs. Park was not joined, and a verdict
was directed for the defendants. Upon appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed because
[a]s the allegations of plaintiffs' petition, after the abandonment
of their claim for the purchase money, only constituted a claim
for the land, and the supreme court having decided that they could
not recover the land, there was nothing upon which a verdict for
the plaintiff could be based, and it was the duty of the trial court
to direct a verdict for the defendants.33
Despite this conclusion, the court of civil appeals went on to consider
whether Mrs. Park was a necessary party. In this connection, the court
of civil appeals also stated that "Mrs. Harmer could not recover... unless
Mrs. Park was made a party.... 4
We think it is well settled that, in actions upon joint contracts, all
persons in whom the right of action exists must be made parties
thereto; and the failure to make them such will prove fatal to the
right to recover, whether the defendant pleads such want of parties
in abatement or not. The failure to make the necessary parties
plaintiff to an action on a joint contract will be considered on
appeal by this court if brought to its notice, whether the defendant
pleads the want of parties below or not, as it is fundamental
error.35
In support of its conclusion, the court of civil appeals cited Holliman
v. Rogerse8 and Stachely v. Pierce,- which held that "[jloint creditors
whether by record, specialty, or simple contract, must all join in an action
31. Summerhill v. Hanner, 72 Tex. 224, 9 S.W. 881 (1888).
32. 9 S.W. at 885.
33. Hanner v. Summerhill, 26 S.WV. 906, 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, writ ref'd).
34. Id. at 908.
35. Id.
36. 6 Tex. 91 (1851).
37. 28 Tex. 328 (1866).
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to recover the debt or the estate which they respectively hold together."38
The approach taken by the court of civil appeals in Hanner v. SummerhUll
reflects the influence of the common law principles of joinder. The identi-
fication of the legal interest as joint determined the necessity of joining
Mrs. Park as a party. Mrs. Hanner had no interest without Mrs. Park's
joinder. Therefore a directed verdict was proper. Equity principles of
complete relief played no role in the conclusion that persons having joint
rights are necessary to the enforcement of those rights. Moreover, although
the result reached could have been analyzed in practical terms, the court
did not refuse to proceed because its judgment would be subject to attack
by an interested person who could render the judgment nugatory in a
subsequent action. Its refusal is premised upon a conceptualistic identifi-
cation of the legal interest as a joint one which must be enforced by all
holders of the joint right together. While it can be doubted that the term
fundamental error enjoyed the same meaning in 1894 that was later given
by the supreme court in Oar v. Davis,39 or later still in Ramsey v. Dunlop,4
the seeds of viewing an absent person's nonjoinder at trial in jurisdictional
terms had been sown.
Many subsequent cases decided before the promulgation of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941 cite Hanner and espouse the formalistic
notion taken from the common law that it perpetuated.41 Although the joint
obligor problem was resolved by statute,42 joint obligees, baiolrs, and bene-
ficiaries were necessary and indispensable, and their absence could be
raised for the first time on appeal. Prior to 1941 Texas courts used the term
necessary to signify a person whose presence was required to adjudicate
a dispute. While a nonjoined person may also have been termed indispensa-
ble prior to the adoption of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and to a
certain extent thereafter, the terms necessary and indispensable were
synonymous. Therefore, care should be taken in reviewing Texas precedent
before Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra.43
38. Id. at 335.
39. 105 Tex. 479, 151 S.W. 794 (1912). Fundamental error is "such error as
being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of the procceding and affects thejudgment necessarily." 151 S.W. at 796, citing Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex.
94, 104, 122 S.W. 533, 537 (1909).
40. 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (Tex. 1947). "[An error which directly and
adversely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared in
the statutes or constitution of this state is fundamental error." 205 S.W.2d at 983.
41. See Nail v. Taylor, 223 S.W. 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1920, no writ);
McKay v. Peterson, 220 S.W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1920, no writ); Modern
Woodman of America v. Yanofsky, 187 S.W. 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1916,
writ refd) (joint insurance beneficiaries held necessary parties); Barlow v. Linss, 180
S.W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1915, writ ref'd) (joint obligees ruled necessary
parties); Western Grocery Co. v. Jata, 173 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1915,
no writ) (partners determined to be necessary parties in suit by or against a partner-
ship).
42. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 1986-87 (1964).
43. 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966). Refer to text accompanying notes 52-67 infra.
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IV. Co.mI usony JOINDER OF PARTIEs UNDER T=E 1941
TExAS RuLmS oF Civnr PRocEwuE
When the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1941, the
1937 version of Federal Rule 19 was adopted with minor textual change
as Texas Rule 39.4 Shortly after the rule was adopted an advisory opinion
-was handed down by the subcommittee on interpretation of the Rules of
Civil Procedure 4 This opinion is interesting because of its muddled treat-
ment of the problem and consequently it is printed in full.
Question (No. 22): Vhere the owner of a portion of a royalty
under an oil lease brings suit against the lessee to recover damages
because of the breach of implied contract of reasonable develop-
ment, is it mandatory that all persons who own portions of the
royalty be joined?
Answer: This matter is dealt with by Rule 39 which provides
that persons having a joint interest shall be joined in the suit. This
rule is taken from Federal Rule 19, and under the annotations to
the Federal rule it has been held a number of times that the
phrase, "joint interest," should be construed to mean those who
would be necessary in the sense of indispensable parties under
the previous practice.
If under the previous practice all royalty owners were not
necessary parties in such a suit, then it is the opinion of the com-
mittee that it would not be necessary to join them because of the
adoption of new rules. On the other hand, if joinder of all would
have been necessary under the old practice, then it is still neces-
sary under the new rules.
The subcommittee calls attention to possible relaxations sug-
gested by and under the conditions stated in Subdivisions (b) and
(c) of Rule 39 and in Rule 42.
The subcommittee feels that the above general construction
of the rule is as far as it can properly go in answering the question.
44. Necessary Joinder of Parties.(a) Necessary joinder. Except as otherwise provided in these rules,
persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined as plain-
tiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to
do so, he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.(b) Effect of failure to join. When persons who ought to be parties if
complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, have not been
made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall
order them made parties. The court in its discretion ma proceed in the
action without making such persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them
can be acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance, but the judg-
ment rendered therein shall not affect the rights or liabilities of persons who
are not parties.(c) Names of omitted persons and reasons for non-joinder to be pleaded.
In any pleading in which relief is asked, the pleader shall set forth the names,
if known to him, of persons who ought to be parties, if complete relief is to
be accorded between those already parties, but who are not joined, and shall
state why they are omitted.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 39 (1967).
45. Civil Procedure, 5 Tnx. B.J. 287 (1942). Committee members were Robert
W. Stayton, chairman, Randolph Carter, and W. A. Vinson.
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In other words, the subcommittee feels that it should confine its
interpretations to general explanation of the rules, and should
not undertake to brief questions arising under the facts of specific
cases.
In the above opinion the subcommittee consulted with and
was aided by Roy W. McDonald.40
By using the terms indispensable and necessary as synonymous terms,
the opinion construing Rule 39 further confused the subject. Despite later
comments by Professor Stayton interpreting Rule 39,47 the case law failed
to reflect an understanding that the rule substantially modified principles
set out in the case law decided before 1941. One civil appeals court con-
cluded that Rule 39 was inapplicable to the extent that it displaced the
common law principles.4
As late as 1956 the rule appears to have made no real impact upon
the prior practice. For example, in Scott v. Graham,49 an action brought
by a taxpayer against the district attorney, county treasurer, county judge,
and county commissioners to have a commissioners' court order authorizing
payment of $600 to an assistant district attorney declared void, the supreme
court concluded that the county in its corporate form was a necessary party.
However, the most-strildng aspect of the opinion is its consideration of the
practical consequences of the issuance of an injunction in the absence of
the county in its corporate form as the court stated, 'Without a judgment
against the county, there will be nothing to prevent its future officials from
making the payment which petitioner now seeks to enjoin.""0 The joint
interest analysis taken from the common law is not the basis of the opinion,
which harkens back to Bruly and De La Vega. Similarly in Royal Petroleum
Corp. v. Dennis, the supreme court again defined a necessary party as
one without whom a final judgment or decree could not be made.
The most important Texas case decided under the 1941 compulsory
joinder rule (old Rule 39) was Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra,52
which construed the provisions of Rule 39 in accordance with federal prece-
dent construing Federal Rule 19,13 from which Rule 39 was copied.
46. Id.
47. R. Stayton, Important Developments in Trial Civil Procedure Since 1940,
STATE BAR oF TExAs REFRESmER HANDBooK 3 (1946).
48. Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Corp., 188 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1945, writ refd w.o.m.), noted in 24 TEXAs L. REv. 511 (1946).
49. 156 Tex. 97, 292 S.W.2d 324 (1956).
Whether a person is a necessary party is determined by his Interest In the
subject matter and outcome of the suit .... [All persons who claim a direct
interest in the object and subject matter of the suit and whose interest will
necessarily be affected by any judgment that may be rendered therein, are
not only proper parties, but are necessary and indispensable parties.
292 S.W.2d at 327.
50. 292 S.W.2d at 327.
51. 160 Tex. 392, 332 S.W.2d 313 (1960), noted in 15 Sw. L.J. 172 (1961).
52. 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (1965).
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Petroleum Anchor brought suit to cancel a bill of sale and a subsequent
assignment of an invention by the buyer to defendant Tyra on the ground
that the sale and the subsequent assignment were the result of a fraudulent
.conspiracy. The'buyer was not made a party defendant in the action by
Petroleum Anchor and no one raised the question of the buyer's absence
at trial. Judgment was rendered that Petroleum Anchor take nothing.
Petroleum Anchor appealed and the court of civil appeals noted that the
buyer was a necessary and indispensable party in whose absence the trial
court had no jurisdiction to proceed.- The supreme court reversed.
The opinion of the supreme court is of major importance for the careful
analysis given the provisions of Rule 39. After indicating that Texas courts
"have been inclined to give too little attention to the wording of the rule
and overriding attention and effect to prior judicial decisions, often ignoring
the rule altogether,"-5 the court stated that the language of Rule 39(a),
which provided that "[p]ersons having a joint interest shall be made parties
and be joined as plaintiffs or defendants," 0 when properly interpreted,
constituted the rule's definition of "indispensable" parties whose joinder
in the trial court was essential to jurisdiction. On the other hand, when the
rule spoke in terms of "persons who ought to be parties if complete relief
is to be accorded between those already parties,"5 7 it indicated that they
were not indispensable because the rule conferred discretion upon the trial
court to proceed without joinder of such persons if jurisdiction over them
could not be acquired except by their consent or voluntary appearance.
The court reasoned that "[i]f joinder of such persons is discretionary, their
joinder cannot be essential to jurisdiction of a court to proceed to judg-
ment."55 The court noted that persons in the second category are referred
to as "conditionally necessary" by federal authority and that Professor
Stayton had termed them "insistible."r0 Finally, conditionally necessary or
insistible persons were required to be joined if a party to the suit insisted
upon their joinder at trial However, a party could not insist upon the join-
der of a conditionally necessary person not subject to the jurisdiction of
the court.61
After clarifying the nomenclature to be utilized henceforward in con-
struing Rule 39, the court stated that the buyer had no joint interest with
Tyra because he had long since disposed of his interest and no relief was
sought against the buyer. The court also considered whether the buyer
54. Petroleum Anchor Equip., Inc. v. Tyra, 392 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1965), re'd, 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966).
55. 406 S.W.2d at 892.
56. TEx. R. CIv. P. 39(a) (1967).
57. Id. 39(b).
58. 406 S.V.2d at 893.
59. 3A J. Moorm, FEDE A Pimcncm t 19.05[2] (2d ed. 1974).
60. 406 S.W.2d at 893, quoting R. Stayton, Important Dcclopments Since 1940
in the Texas Law Relating to Parties and Actions in Umrvmtsrrx oF TExs Lw Rn-
r ;rsxma (on file with University of Texas School of Law Library).
61. 406 S.V.2d at 893.
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would have been prejudiced by a decree enjoining use of the invention
after cancellation of the bill of sale. Here, the court stated that the buyer
could not be legally prejudiced because a judgment would not be res
judicata in any subsequent litigation "to which he may b6 a party," 2 and
that although "[p]ersons whose rights will be factually prejudiced are
sometimes held to be indispensable ...in such cases the interests of the
absent parties should be more directly involved than are the interests of
Fite [the buyer] in this suit." 3 Thus, despite the fact that cancellation of
the bill of sale given to Fite by Petroleum Anchor might result in a suit by
Tyra against Fite to recover money paid Fite for the assignment of the
invention sold, his interest was too remote to require his joinder. In this
connection the opinion demonstrates the influence of Professor Reed's
article on compulsory joinder of parties which the court cites. 4 The inter-
ests of the absent person were analyzed as too remote to preclude litigation
from proceeding between Petroleum Anchor and Tyra. The interest of
Petroleum Anchor in having a forum (Fite was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Texas) overbalanced any possible prejudice to the absent
person or to defendant Tyra.15
However, the court's focus on the language of the rule itself necessi-
tated that the rule's joint interest formulation be interpreted each time
the question of required joinder was raised for the first time on appeal.
The legacy of the common law principles of joinder was firmly embedded
in the phrase "joint interest," thereby making the adoption of a set of
balancing principles manifestly difficult. In short, the rule itself was not
62. Id. at 894.
63. Id. at 895.
64. Id., citing Reed, CompuLsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Micu.
L. REv. 327, 340 (1957). Professor Reed notes that Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 130 (1854), constitutes the most influential United States Supreme Court
case on the subject of required joinder of parties. 55 MIcH. L. REv. at 340. He criti-
cizes Shields because it resulted in a belief "that certain persons, depending up~on the
nature of their rights ('common,' 'joint,' 'united in interest') are, automatically and
for all time delegated to one class [necessary] or the other [indispensable]." Id. at 355.
He suggests that the classification of persons as necessary ("Persons having an interest
in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may
act ...and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice." Shields
v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854)) or indispensable ('Persons who not
only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final
decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the contro-
versy in such a condition that the final termination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience." 58 U.S. at 139) should be abandoned In favor of an
informal, rational balancing of competing interests." 55 MicH. L. REv. at 356. Professor
Reed's central thesis is that the plaintiff may be left without a remedy unless he can
proceed in the absence of a party who is beyond the court's jurisdiction or whose
presence will destroy diversity. The interest of the plaintiff in having a forum must
be balanced against the possible factual prejudice which the party defendant or the
absent person may suffer, and formulistic notions derived from Shields do not permit
the informal balancing of the interests, "interests relatin to the helplessness of the
plaintiff, double vexation of defendant, the possible effect on absent persons, the
convenience of the court, and the equity and good conscience-in short, the justness-
of the end result." Id. at 355-56.
65. 406 S.W. 2d at 895.
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suited to a consideration of the question of required joinder in practical
terms.
One other aspect of Petroleum Anchor should also be considered. The
court stated that if an absent person was "truly indispensable," it would
be fundamental error to proceed in his absence.cz Although the definition
of fundamental error had been narrowed by adoption of the 1941 Rules of
Civil Procedure, it still included proceeding without parties who are indis-
pensable, meaning those having a joint interest "properly interpreted."G7
Although it is relatively clear that the proper interpretation was to proceed
pragmatically and that the phrase "joint interest" was to be given a narrow
construction, the matter was still viewed in jurisdictional terms.
It is somewhat ironic that just about the time the Texas Supreme Court
was deciding how to construe the 1941 version of Rule 39, criticism of
the 1937 version of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from
which the Texas rule was taken, led to its complete revision in 1966.C3
The phrase joint interest" was deleted, and the revised rule was written in
pragmatic terms incorporating virtually all of Professor Reeds analysis.3
By its order of July 21, 1970, effective January 1, 1971,70 the Texas Supreme
Court completely rewrote Texas Rule 39 to adopt, with minor changes, the
provisions of Federal Rule 19 as amended.71
V. NEw RuLE 39
New Rule 39, like its federal counterpart, does not include the phrase
"joint interest."72 Much of the criticism of old Federal Rule 19 was directed
toward the wasteful consequence of voiding judgments when the matter
of the absence of a person was raised for the first time on appeal without
regard to what occurred in the action in the trial court simply because
the interest was labeled as a "joint interest."73 While deletion of the
words "joint interest" from the rules does not in itself solve the problem
of determining when in fact a nonjoined person's interest is of such a
character that the trial court should refuse to proceed without his
joinder or when his absence can be raised for the first time on appeal, the
approach taken by the new Texas Rule 39 focuses the inquiry upon the
66. Id. at 892.
67. Id. at 892-93.
68. See Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule
19, 79 YATR L.J. 403 (1965); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. 1-2), 81 HAnV. L. RE%-.
356,591 (1967).
69. See Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MicIL L. REv.
327 (1957).
70. TEx. R. Crv. P. 39.
71. For a demonstration of the dissatisfaction with the method of classifying
parties under the 1941 rule refer to Soules, Indispensable Parties, 1 ST. MtRYs L.J.
65 (1967).
72. TEx. M. CIv. P. 39.
73. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HAv. L. REv. 356, 366 (1967).
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factors to be considered in determining when an absent person should be
regarded as indispensable. Currently Rule 39 speaks of "persons to be
joined if feasible" and persons "regarded as indispensable."74
Persons to be joined if feasible are: (1) persons who ought to be joined
if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties (all persons who
formerly were labeled "insistible"); (2) persons who claim an interest
relating to the subject of the action whose ability to protect that interest
may be impaired or impeded "as a practical matter" by disposition of the,
action in their absence; and, (3) persons who claim an interest relating to
the subject of the action whose nonjoinder may leave any persons already
parties to a "substantial risk" of incurring double, multiple or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the nonjoined person's claimed interest.
If an absent person is a "person to be joined as feasible," upon proper
motion "the court shall order that he be made a party defendant or an
involuntary plaintiff" provided that he is amenable to process. If he is not
amenable to process, it must be determined whether he should be "regarded
as indispensable."
Assuming that it has been determined that a nonjoined party is a
person to be joined if feasible who is not amenable to process, the
trial court must determine whether the action should proceed "in equity
and good conscience" in the absence of the nonjoined party. The rule
enumerates the four factors to be considered by the court in determining
indispensability:
First, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or to those already parties; second,
the extent to which, by protective provisions of the judgment, by
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened
or avoided; third, whether the judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder."5
Therefore, the major change in the wording of Rule 39 involved the substi-
tution of practical principles for the abstract concept of "jointness" and the
supplementauon of the "complete relief" concept with language that directs
courts to consider the practical consequences of proceeding in the absence
of the nonjoined party. The literal language of the rule contemplates that
the absence of an interested party will be raised at trial.
VI. THE IssUE oF FuNDaAmENTA Ermon
Under old Rule 39 failure to join persons who were indispensable




constituted fundamental error which could not be waived.76
The United States Supreme Court in Prooident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson77 dearly disposed of the argument that the indis-
pensable party doctrine is substantive and therefore that the amended
rule conflicts with Erie,78 when it rejected the following argument:
(1) there is a category of persons called "indispensable parties";
(2) that category is defined by substantive law and the definition
cannot be modified by rules; (3) the right of a person falling within
that category to participate in the lawsuit in question is also a
substantive matter, and is absoluteP
Hence, the Erie doctrine does not pose a problem in the interpretation
of Federal Rule 19. The Court also stated that
to say that a court "must' dismiss in the absence of an indis-
pensable party and that it "cannot proceed" without him, puts the
matter the wrong way around: A court does not know whether a
particular person is "indispensable" until it has examined the situ-
ation to determine whether it can proceed without him."
The Prooident Tradesmens opinion indicates that, practically, four
interests are to be considered in determining whether a nonjoined person
should be regarded as indispensable: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in
having a forum; (2) the interest of the defendant in avoiding multiple liti-
gation or inconsistent relief or sole responsibility; (3) the interest of the
absent party; and (4) the interest of the public in complete, consistent and
efficient settlement of controversies by wholes.8 '
The plaintiffs interest in having a forum must be contrasted with the
defendant's correlative interest in avoiding multiple litigation or incon-
sistent relief or sole responsiblity. However, Justice Harlan states that the
plaintiff having chosen the forum, the parties defendant "will not be
heard to complain about the sufficiency of the relief obtainable against
them."82 Similarly, if the defendant raises the absence of a party at trial,
the court should test the strength of the plaintiff's interest in having a
forum by determining whether a satisfactory alternative forum exists. But,
76. Although no all-inclusive definition of fundamental error has been promul-
gated, error is generally considered to be fundamental if (1) it directly and adversly
affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared in the statutes
or constitution of Texas, and (2) the record affirmatively shows upon its face that
the court rendering the judment was without jurisdiction over the subject matter.
State v. Sunland Supply Field, 404 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1966); McCauley v. Consoli-
dated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957); Ramsey v. Dunlop,
146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979, 983 (1947).
77. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
78. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
79. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118
(1968).
80. Id. at 119.
81. Id. at 109-11.
82. Id. at 111.
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failure by the defendant to raise the absence of a nonjoined party at trial
"properly forecloses any interest of theirs."3 The defect can be waived
and is not considered jurisdictional in nature. Therefore, if the parties
before the court of trial do not raise the absence of a person, they will
normally be precluded from raising the matter on appeal.
The interest of the absent person must, however, also be considered.
The reason for considering the absent party's interest is that although he
will not normally be bound by principles of res judicata,M his interest may
be impaired or impeded as a practical matter.s5 When the absence of a
person who should have been joined in the lower court is noticed for the
first time on appeal by the appellate court, the effect that the proceedings
below and the judgment rendered have on the absent party can be deter-
mined. It is therefore possible to decide whether the absent person should
be regarded as indispensable on a practical basis. The matter has been
litigated and the extent to which the absent party's interest has been im-
paired or impeded, if any, can be analyzed. Justice Harlan states that when
the risk of harm or loss is not trivial, the appellate court should modify the
judgment on equitable principles if the absent party has not purposely
bypassed the proceeding. 86 The rule permits the shaping or framing of
relief so that the absent party's interest is preserved and protected. How-
ever, if it can be determined that the absent party purposely bypassed
the proceeding when he could have intervened, the court should determine
whether this factor forecloses equitable protection of the absent party by
modification of the decree. 87 Lastly, the public's interest in the efficient
and economical operation of our judicial system requires the appellate court
to preserve as much of the prior proceeding as possible."8
If the analysis utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Provident
Tradesmens is utilized by Texas appellate courts in construing Texas Rule
39, the concept of fundamental error should virtually disappear from
appellate decisions involving Rule 39. As the following paragraphs show,
83. Id. at 112.
84. A nonjoined person may, however, be bound by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel where he controls the action or where his interests are adequately represented.
See, e.g., Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363-64 (Tex. 1971), citing
RESTATEMENT OF JuDGMENTS § 84 (1942). See also Ramos v. Horton, 456 S.W.2d 505,
568 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, no writ). Refer to note 86 infra.
85. The classic situation involves one in which the nonjoined person claims an
interest in a particular fund which constitutes the subject matter of the litigation.
An award of the res to a party may lead to its dissipation prior to the time the non-
joined person has any ability to protect his or her interest.
86. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111,
114 (1968); see Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Richardson 387 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd) (intervention required by joint owner of cause of
action). See also Price v. Couch, 462 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1970).
87. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pt. 1), 81 HAnv. L. REv. 356, 366 (1967).
88. See F. JAMES, Crvm PnocmotmE § 9.18, at 418 (1965). See also Bank of
California Natl Ass'n v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516, 106 P.2d 379 (1940).
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it is now apparent that the Supreme Court of Texas intends to interpret
new Rule 39 in light of the principles enunciated in the Proviident Trades-
mnens case.
VII. TExAs CASES ImrTE'nRIE RuLE 39
The most significant Rule 39 case to date is Cooper v. Texas Gulf
Industries, Inc.s9 In Cooper, the spouses acting together bought realty and
the property was conveyed to both of them. In an action that did not in-
clude the wife, the husband brought suit against the grantor to rescind the
transaction in 1970 (suit 1). The suit was dismissed with prejudice. Sub-
sequently, in 1971, a suit for similar relief was brought by the husband and
wife jointly. The grantor sought summary judgment on the basis of res
Judicata asserting that both the husband and wife were bound by the
prior judgment despite the fact that the wife did not participate in suit 1.
The husband argued that suit 1 was not res judicata as to either spouse
because the wife was an indispensable party to the prior litigation, thereby
rendering the entry of any judgment fundamental error. The supreme court
held that Mrs. Cooper was not an indispensable part), in suit 1. The court
made the following rulings:
(1) It will "be rare indeed if there were a person whose presence
was so indispensable in the sense that his absence deprives the court of
jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties already joined."0
(2) The practice whereby the husband could act for and represent
the wife in an action concerning their jointly managed community property
by virtue of the doctrine of virtual representation was abolished by the
provisions of the Texas Family Code. The wife is like any other jointly
interested individual. Therefore, the judgment of dismissal with prejudice
against husband in suit 1 is not res judicata with respect to the wife's
rights.91
(3) The omission of one of the spouses as a party in an action con-
cerning their jointly managed community property does not, however,
render the judgment void. The judgment binds the husband spouse who
was a party "except to the extent that it might have to be disregarded in
giving all the relief to which she may show herself entitled.",'
Therefore, in Cooper the supreme court held that Mr. Cooper could
not avoid the binding force of a judgment against him in a suit brought
by him alone to rescind a transaction under which Mr. and Mrs. Cooper
purchased land from the grantor, while ruling that Coopers wife was a
joint owner of the land. The supreme court assumed that the land involved
89. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), noted in 52 TE.,As L. ltav. 1410 (1974).
90. 513 SAV.2d at 204.
91. Id. at 202, 205. But see note 86 supra.
92. 513 S.W.2d at 205.
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in Cooper was jointly managed community property as indicated by the
conveyance of the land to the spouses jointly.93 Section 5.22 of the Texas
Family Code provides that the joifitly managed community property can-
not be disposed of by one spouse acting alone.N Although some very ques-
tionable authority exists for the proposition that joint management also
means several management in the context of section 5.22 of the Texas
Family Code,95 it appears that the factual situation in Cooper involves an
instance where the legislature has made rights joint and not several.90 Since,
however, the outcome of suit 1 was unfavorable with respect to the relief
claimed by Mr. Cooper, the court's ruling that the outcome of suit 1 is
conclusive as to Mr. Cooper's rights "except to the extent that it might have
to be disregarded in giving [the other spouse] all the relief to which [he
or] she may show [himself or] herself entitled" 7 is perfectly consistent
with the Provident Tradesmens analysis. However, the opinion should not
be construed to stand for the proposition that joint is synonymous with joint
and several.98
The supreme court reiterated its holding in Cooper in the case of
Dulak v. Dulak.9 9 In Dulak the husband and wife purchased land for
which they gave a joint note. The land was conveyed to both spouses. The
husband subsequently procured the release of the note from the seller.
Suit was later brought against the husband to cancel the release as pro-
cured by undue influence. Judgment was rendered against the husband in
the trial court. On appeal, the husband contended that the wife was an
indispensable party to the suit presumably because of her joint interest in
the land and her joint execution of the purchase money note payable to
the seller as well as the deed of trust which was also jointly executed. As
in Cooper suit 1, no party raised the absence of the nonjoined spouse until
after the entry of final judgment. The court of civil appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the wife was bound by the trial court's judgment under the doc-
93. Id. at 202.
94. TEx. FAmILY CODEANN. § 5.22(c) (1975
95. See, e.g., Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1934, writ dism'd by agr.). For a result which seems premised upon
the conclusion that joint management also means several management refer to McGee,
Marital Property Rights Under the Texas Family Code and the Equal Creditor Opportu-
nity Act, 30 PmSONAL FiN. L.Q. REP. 14, 17 (1975).
96. Traditionally, joint obligees have been considered to be indispensable parties
plaintiff. Joint obligors had to be joined as defendants but if an obligor was unavail-
able the action could proceed without that person. See F JAmES, Civr, PnocEDUln
§ 9.22, at 430 (1965); see, e.g., Barlow v. Linss, 180 S.W. 652, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1915, writ ref'd) (joint obligees).
97. 513 S.W.2d at 205. Although it appears that the judgment in suit 1 would
have to be completely disregarded in order to protect the wife's interest, the court
could fashion a remedy, such as the granting of a damage award to Mrs. Cooper which
would not require a total disregard of the judgment with prejudice against Mr. Cooper.
98. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67,
88-90 (1975).
99. 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974).
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trine of virtual representation. 100 The supreme court, despite the abolition
of the doctrine in the context of joint management community property,
held that failure to name the spouse did not constitute a jurisdictional
defect and cited Cooper as governing authority.1"
In analyzing Dulak, it becomes clear that Mrs. Dulak was a party to
be joined if feasible because she had an interest in the subject of the
action, the cancellation of a release which concerned her individual liability
and marital property as security. Similarly, her joinder was feasible because
she was amenable to process. However, the supreme court properly con-
cluded that she should not have been regarded as indispensable. This
conclusion is sound under modem Rule 39 analysis because (1) the plain-
tiffs chose the parties and the forum and cannot complain about the
sufficiency of the relief obtainable; (2) the defendant did not complain
of her absence at trial and his interest is foreclosed; (3) Mrs. Dulaks
interest needs no protection on appeal because the supreme court con-
cluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Dulak
exercised undue influence in securing the cancellation of the release-hence
the release was ultimately not cancelled;10 2 and (4) the public's interest
in judicial efficiency was protected by preserving as much of the case as
possible.
VIII. SUBSTANTIVE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
The Supreme Court of Texas does not have the power to make and
establish rules of procedure which are inconsistent with laws enacted by
the Texas legislature.103 It could be argued that when the legislature
enacts a statute which makes rights enforceable jointly, but not severally,
100. 496 S.W.2d 776 782 (Ter. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), rev'd, 513 S.W.2d
205 (Tex. 1974). Under tle doctrine of virtual representation, in certain situations
a person may be bound by a judgment under the principles of res judicata even
though he or she is not even a formal party to the action. The doctrine is generally
applied where the nonjoined person is considered to be adequately represented by
another person who has an identical interest and when it is practically necessary to
bind nonjoined persons in order for a court to render an effective judgment. Sec
Mason v. Mason, 366 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. 1963) (trusts); F. JA.ms, CvIL Pnoctnumn
§ 11.28, at 592 (1965). See also Note, 52 T&As L. REv. 1410 (1975). Of course, the
most common application of the doctrine today is in lam action litigation. But zec
Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Corp., 188 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1945, writ refd w.o.m.).
101. 513 S.W.2d at 207. See TEE. REv. Civ. STAT. As¢w. arts. 1986-87 (1964).
Where joint obligors are primarily liable on a contract they may be sued "either alone
or jointly with any other party thereon." Id. art. 1986. Sce also Swinford v. Allied Fin.
Co., 424 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968);
Nelson v. Seidel, 328 S.W.2d 805 (Teax. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
When one joint obligor is not primarily liable on the contract, "unless judgment also
be entered against such other principal obligor .... . except when he "resides beyond
the limits of the State or. . . cannot be reached by the ordinary process of law, or
... his residence is unknown.. . or... he is dead, or actually or notoriously insolvent
... no judgment shall be rendered." TmE. Rnv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1987 (1964).
102. 513 S.W.2d at 210.
103. Tmx. Coxsr. art. V, § 25.
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the legislature has created a category of persons who must be regarded
as indispensable as a matter of substantive law.104 Hence, the analysis
utilized by Justice Harlan in Provident Tradesmens that no class of pro-
defined indispensable persons existed for Erie purposes, which the Texas
Supreme Court may have adopted, should be considered in a context of
the supreme court's rule-making power.1 5
The case of Hinofosa v. Love'00 clearly illustrates the dilemma. Love
and the bank were joint payees of a note within section 3.116(b) of the
Uniform Commercial Code.107 Plaintiff Love sued the sole maker of the
note. Judgment was rendered in favor of Love against Hinojosa by default.
Hinojosa raised the absence of the bank in his motion for new trial which
the trial court overruled. The court of civil appeals held that the bank
was an indispensable party, by virtue of section 3.116(b) (under substantive
law) .108 The appellate court interpreted section (c) of Rule 39 as placing on
the plaintiff the burden of pleading and proving why he should be entitled
to proceed in the absence of an indispensable party.'19 In substance, the
opinion utilizes the joint interest analysis used prior to the amendment
of Texas Rule 39 in defining the bank as an indispensable party in whose
absence the court did not have jurisdiction to proceed because of funda-
mental error.
Although the court of civil appeals improperly failed to recognize the
admonition of the supreme court in Cooper that the amendment to Rule 39
replaced the historical and classical approach to joinder of parties,110 it is
interesting to speculate how the supreme court would have decided Hinoosa
v. Love. If Hinojosa is correct in its result, although the term joint interest
was removed from Rule 39, it was not removed from the substantive law
of commercial paper by the amendment of the procedural rule. However,
if the Provident Tradesmens analysis apparently adopted by the Texas
Supreme Court in Cooper is utilized, since the defendant failed to raise
the absence of the bank at trial, his interest is properly foreclosed.' More-
over, it is clearly possible to protect the interest of the bank by remanding
the case for determination of the bank's interest, if any, in the final judgment
obtained by Love against Hinojosa in the trial court. There is no reason
why the judgment should be voided except to the extent that it might
104. See, e.g., Crickmer v. King, 507 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1974, no writ). See also Clear Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Clear Lake Util. Co., 537
S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
105. See also TFx. R. Crv. P. 108. For a consideration of the potential constitu-
tional limitation on the supreme court rule-making power refer to Sampson, Long Arm
Jurisdiction Marries the Texas Family Code, 38 Tax. B.J. 1023, 1033 n.20 (1975).
106. 496 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
107. Tax. Bus. & Comm. CODE ANN. § 3.116(b) (Tex. UCC 1968).
108. 496 S.W.2d at 226.
109. Id. at 227.
110. Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. 1974).




have to be subsequently modified in giving the bank all relief to which it
may show itself entitled. One could support Hinoosa by arguing that the
interest of the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of
controversies by wholes does not include an interest in preserving default
judgments. However, Texas has observed no particular solicitude for de-
faulting parties." There is no reason to do so here, unless of course there
is a class of indispensable parties defined by substantive statutory law.
A determination that legislation has created a small class of prede-
fined indispensable persons would provide a functional exception to the
required joinder of parties principles enunciated in Provident Trades-
mens and apparently adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Cooper,
except that it is difficult to distinguish Cooper from HinoJosa. Section 3.116
(b) of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code makes the right to enforce
a note payable to A and B a joint right113 Section 5.22 of the Texas
Family Code makes the right to manage jointly managed community
property joint." 4 Mr. Cooper had no more legal capacity under the sub-
stantive law of marital property to dispose of joint management community
property alone by a rescission suit than did Love to enforce the joint note.
Therefore, unless the fact that Love won his case by default (if Love lost,
the bank could not possibly have been prejudiced, nor could Hinojosa
have been subjected to double liability) whereas Mr. Cooper lost suit 1
is controlling, it is submitted that the two cases cannot be reconciled.
Hence Hinojosa may have been decided incorrectly. While it can be argued
that the Texas Supreme Court is proscribed from making rules that are
substantive, the criticism of Federal Rule 19 as substantive and its suc-
cessful rebuttal by Justice Harlan should suffice to silence criticism of
the Texas Supreme Court in adopting and properly interpreting Texas
Rule 39.1'5
The supreme court has not been called upon to again discuss the
proper interpretation of Rule 39 since Dulak. However, several courts of
civil appeals have attempted to resolve interpretative problems in con-
nection with Rule 39. In Phillips v. Teinert,"6 decided before Cooper and
Dulak, although no party raised the matter at trial, the court of civil
appeals reversed the lower court judgment where a husband who, with his
wife, had sued for injuries sustained in an automobile accident, died be-
tween time of suit and the time of trial. The basis of the reversal was that
his estate, heirs, or legal representatives succeeded to his cause of action
and therefore had a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit that
112. See Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950).
But see Deen v. Deen, 530 S.W.2d 913, 915-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Vorth 1975,
no writ).
113. Tsx. Bus. & Comm. CODE AcN. § 3.116(b) (Tex. UCC 1968).
114. Tx. Fmy CODE ANN. § 5.22(c) (1975).
115. Refer to text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
116. 493 S.V.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
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would necessarily be affected by any judgment rendered. Hence, they
were indispensable parties to the suit and the error was fundamental. Al-
though no one filed a suggestion of death in the case, the result reached
by the court of civil appeals appears to be entirely inconsistent with the
principles enunciated in Cooper and Provident Tradesmens. While the opin-
ion does not reflect the amount of the judgment, the decedent and his wife
had judgment rendered for them jointly. The setting aside of this judgment
seems a strange way to protect the estate, heirs, or legal representatives
who succeeded to the decedent's cause of action. The public's interest
in preserving as much of the prior proceeding as possible was not con-
sidered by the appellate court. Consequently, the case appears to be of
dubious precedential value. However, the same court of civil appeals, sub-
sequent to the supreme court's decision in Cooper, properly held in Huf-
fington v. Upchurch'17 that two ex-partners who did not claim an interest
in an oil and gas prospect which was the subject matter of the litigation
were not indispensable parties where a matter of absence was raised for
the first time after verdict.
The case of Williams v. Saxon118 also appears to adopt the analysis
utilized by the supreme court in Cooper. In an action brought against the
husband without the joinder of his spouse for specific performance to
convey certain community property, the purchaser prevailed in the trial
court. The husband, for the first time on appeal, contended that his wife
was an indispensable party to the action since it involved community
property which constituted the family homestead and that the judgment
was void because of the wife's interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
The appellate court concluded that Rule 39 did not preclude the entry of
a valid and binding judgment insofar as the husband's rights were concerned
except to the extent that the judgment might have to be disregarded in
according the wife her homestead rights."'
Several courts of civil appeals have recently considered Rule 39 in the
context of probate proceedings. In Jennings v. Srp120 the Corpus Christi
Court of Civil Appeals concluded that all devisees and legatees named in
a will are indispensable parties to an action to contest the will and that
when a construction or contest of the will could result in any of the estate
passing by intestate succession, the heirs-at-law of the decedent are also
indispensable parties, and the trial court was without jurisdiction to proceed
without them. In the case of Soto v. Ledesma,121 the Corpus Christi Court
of Civil Appeals also held that when a purported will has been offered for
probate but has not been admitted to probate, the parties named in the
117. 523 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 532 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1976).
118. 521 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
119. Id. at 91.
120. 521 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
121. 529 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
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purported will are not interested parties contemplated by Rule 39. A third
probate case, Glover v. Landes,'2 was decided by the Houston Court of
Civil Appeals. The court held that devisees of a proponent of a will who
died during the pendency of an action to set aside an order admitting a
will to probate could not be indispensable parties where a suggestion of
death of the proponent was filed under Rule 151 and the legal representa-
tive of the proponent's estate was substituted for the proponent. The three
foregoing probate cases appear not to have utilized the type of analysis
mandated by the Texas Supreme Court in Cooper and Dulak. The mechan-
ical analysis apparently utilized by the courts of civil appeals is at variance
with modern Rule 39 analysis.'m
IX. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the analysis enunciated by
Justice Harlan in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson.12
Henceforth, it will be rare indeed when an appellate court properly deter-
mines that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute when
the nonjoining person's absence is raised for the first time on appeal by
one of the parties in the trial court, at least insofar as the judgment affects
parties who participated in the trial, directly or indirectly, or who pur-
posely bypassed the proceedings. The doctrine of fundamental error should
no longer protect persons from the binding force of judgments when they
have had the opportunity to raise the absence of the nonjoined person
and waived it. It is submitted that the new Rule 39 methodology is a signif-
icant improvement. The "Joint interest" analysis which had its genesis in
early common law principles of required joinder should be laid to rest. It
has caused enough trouble.
122. 530 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd
nxr.e.).
123. See, e.g., Griffith v. Conard, 536 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, no writ); McBurnett v. Gordon, 534 S.W.2d 370 (Tem. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976,
writ refd n.r.e.) (examples of proper result without detailed analysis). See also Trx.
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art 1982 (1964).
124. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
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